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Although  foreign  subsidiaries  usually  perform  better  than  the  average  of  the  hosting  economies, 
empirical literature has also established that the selection effect is statistically significant. In this paper 
we attempt to evaluate its economic relevance, using a unique dataset of annual financial reports by all 
medium and large Polish enterprises over a period 1996-2007. We match firms privatized with the use 
of FDI to a control group of non-privatized state owned companies in order to disentangle the effect of 
self-selection and FDI entry.  
Evidence suggests that although FDI enters more frequently into companies who already participate in 
the international trading networks, roughly half of the export intensity differential may be attributed to 
the  entry  of  FDI.  On  the  other  hand,  selection  effects  seem  to  dominate  as  far  as  efficiency  is 
concerned, while only towards the end of the sample the positive effect of FDI on profitability may be 
confirmed. 
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1  Introduction 
In a recent study, Denisova, Eller, Frye and Zhuravskaya (2009) view privatization as a form of a game 
between the market and the state. The extent to which the foreign ownership is allowed may depend, 
among other factors, on the concentration of political power in a given country. At the same time, foreign 
entry may be either complementary or substitute to improving market institutions. However, in most of 
the transition countries in Europe, the shift from centrally-planned to market economies is over and the 
transition process is largely irreversible, but little evidence exists on the effects of privatization involving 
foreign capital. 
The post-privatization performance superiority of the foreign affiliates’ can be in principle attributed to 
two  effects:  a  true  gain  in  efficiency  (e.g.  through  internationalization)  and  non-random  selection  of 
privatized  firms.  These  effects  cannot  be  disentangled  on  aggregate  or  sectoral  level.  Evaluating  the 
empirical evidence from the market economies, Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin (2001) and Greenaway, 
Sousa  and  Wakelin  (2004)  confirm,  that  the  effect  of  selection  is  statistically  significant.  Subsequent 
research tried to control for the role the selection bias may play in the estimated effects of FDI entry. This 
bias may  even  be  stronger  in  the  context  of  privatization.  Megginson  and  Netter  (2001)  point  to the 
relevance  of  internal  processes  in  the  companies  foreseeing  privatization  (e.g.  pre-privatization 
restructuring). Indeed, DeWenter and Malatesta (2001) demonstrate that the boost in profitability of the 
state-owned enterprises preceeds the event of privatization. 
In this paper we attempt to go beyond the statistical significance in evaluating the contributions of the 
selection effect and the benefits of foreign entry in the context of privatization. We aim to disentangle the 
self-selection and the treatment effects of the FDI entry to state owned enterprises using firm-level data for 
a transition economy - Poland. We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, thanks to applying the 
propensity  score  matching  technique,  we  may  decompose  the  generally  observed  differential  in 
performance into a part attributable to self-selection and a part attributable to the foreign ownership. 
Consequently,  unlike  studies  that  use  Heckman  (1979)  correction,  we  are  able  to  demonstrate  the 
economic relevance of self-selection.  
Second, contrary to a majority of previous studies for Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, 
we use a large and representative data set. Instead of survey data - as customary in the literature - we use a 
panel of all medium and large enterprises over a decade of 1995-2007 in Poland. The data comes from the 
balance sheets and financial reports gathered consistently by the Central Statistical Office from all firms 
employing over 49 workers, which gives us a panel of over 20 000 different companies over the period of 
ten years. Thanks to the size of the data set we are able to control for both industry-specific and individual 
heterogeneity.  
Findings suggest  that indeed  privatized foreign  firms and state-owned firms  differ.  Foreign owned 
privatized  companies  have  higher  profits,  invest  more,  are  more  efficient  and  more  export-oriented. 
Moreover, our results show that in many cases, there is no convergence between the privatized firms with 
inward FDI and SOEs or firms privatized to domestic investor. However, when we decompose the FDI 
performance premia into effects of treatment (changes in performance induced by privatization through 
FDI) from selection (FDI entering into firms who already perform relatively better), the positive impact is 
no longer that evident. In fact, in majority of the cases the self-selection effect is dominant, while FDI 
contribution is decisive for export share and - over a few years - for the investment intensity. As far as the 
profitability and technical efficiency is concerned, self-selection seems to be a very strong factor - more 
efficient state owned firms are privatized to a foreign investor more easily than others.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature on the effects of 
privatization and foreign entry, with the special emphasis on the transition countries. We then move to 
describing the data in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss in detail the employed methodology. Section 5 
presents the results of the analysis. In the concluding remarks we discuss the policy implications emerging 
from this study. 2 
2  Literature review 
Firms’ responses to liberalization of markets are also likely to be heterogeneous. Technologically more 
advanced  enterprises  are  potentially  more  apt  in  adapting  by  further  increasing  investment  in  new 
technologies  and  production  processes.  On  the  other  hand,  firms  lagging  behind  may  require  public 
support (e.g. strategic investment). Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin (2001) were about the first to actually 
microeconometrically  evaluate  whether  there  indeed  are  direct  positive  effects  of  FDI  entry  into  an 
economy. Controlling for foreign entry into sectors of economy at a very disaggregate level, they find that 
although  the  level  and  growth  effects  may  be  confirmed  (foreign  owned  companies  have  higher 
productivity and productivity growth rates than the locals), there is no evidence supporting the increase in 
growth  rates  following  FDI  entry  nor  the  performance  spillovers  from  foreign  to  local  companies. 
Therefore,  Girma,  Greenaway  and  Wakelin  (2001)  argue  that  the  response  to  FDI  presence  may  be 
heterogeneous, for some companies beneficial to the performance, for others - detrimental, and on average 
undetermined. Also Görg and Greenaway (2004) argue that the empirical firm-level evidence in support of 
the positive direct and indirect FDI effects is rather mixed and provide some policy context why such 
effects may not be confirmed, despite the strong theoretical underpinnings. Girma (2005) points to the 
threshold effects for example, while Sabirianova Peter, Svejnar and Terrell (2004) advocate in favor of the 
absorption capacity arguments. More recently, Wang and Yu (2007) demonstrated using the data for China, 
that in fact both these effects may combine, yielding a so-called curvilinear effect1, while the absorptive 
capacity has been at the core of analyses concerning the transition and developing countries. The recent 
examples include Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell (2007) analyzing 17 transition economies. A large 
body  of empirical  studies  analyzing  Indian  and  Indonesian  data  may  be found in  Lipsey  and  Sjöholm 
(2004).  
Privatization seems to raise substantially less controversies. Privatization is believed to improve the 
performance of firms, while in the case of privatization via FDI the effect is shown to be stronger. The 
privatized companies perform better after the change of ownership form, as demonstrated by Megginson, 
Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) for UK, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for US; Harper 
(2002) for Czech Republic. The earlier literature compared also the performance of privatized to the non-
privatized  firms  -  Anderson,  Claessens,  Djankov  and  Pohl  (1997)  and  Vining  and  Boardman  (1992)  - 
finding superiority of the former.  
However, the timing and the mode of privatization seems to matter indeed. Using firm-level evidence 
from CEECs and Rusia, Sabirianova Peter, Svejnar and Terrell (2004) demonstrate that at the beginning of 
the  transformation  processes  the  productivity  gap  referenced  to  the global  efficiency frontier  actually 
increases despite foreign entry and privatization. They justify this finding by arguing that the effects of FDI 
entry and technology spillovers may indeed take some time to materialize. Also firm-level effects are likely 
to differ depending on the definition of the efficiency frontier - evidence seems to support catching up to 
the national frontier for the privatized firms, but the global frontier may indeed be “running away”. This 
assertion  is  corroborated  by  Bartelsman,  Haskel  and  Martin  (2008)  and  Gorodnichenko,  Svejnar  and 
Terrell (2007). On the other hand, in a recent study, Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008) forcefully argue, that 
performance  improves  already  before  privatization,  which  lowers  the  statistical  significance  of  the 
“privatization dummy” despite the actual relevance of the whole economic process. 
The meta-analyses, using the abundant literature in the field, reach similar conclusions. Djankov and 
Murrell (2002) finds a generally positive effect of privatization in both CEECs and CIS and confirms that 
privatization is more ”profound” if it takes place through FDI. However, he also points to the fact, that 
controlling for endogeneity is crucial for the reliability of the findings and demonstrates that over a half of 
studies did not adequately control for the self-selection effects. More recently, Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda 
and  Svejnar  (2009)  include  recent  studies  and  argue  that  privatization  leads  to  a  much  better  firm 
efficiency if performed through a foreign investor. However, they also find that with the domestic investors 
the results are even opposite. Majority shareholding - widely opposed to in transition countries - seems to 
improve the performance of privatized firms. Moreover, privatization is not associated with employment 
reductions: “private  owners  tend  to  keep employment at higher  levels  than state-owned  firms, ceteris 
paribus” (p. 44). 
                                                        
1 Empirical advances in the field have been carefully reviewed by Crespo and Fontoura (2007) 
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Summarizing,  the  literature  has  so  far  shown  mostly  beneficial  effects  of  privatization,  especially 
privatization through a foreign investor. However, the response of firms to the change of ownership as well 
as  the foreign investor depends crucially  on the inherent  heterogeneity of  firms.  The  role of the self-
selection has been either overlooked or tackled with the use of Heckman (1979) correction, which does not 
permit the evaluation of its economic significance. Following the recommendation of Djankov and Murrell 
(2002), we develop a framework basing on the propensity score matching (PSM) technique in order to 
control for the non-random selection of privatized enterprises. Recently, also Chari, Chen and Dominguez 
(2009) applied this technique to evaluate the post-acquisition performance of publicly traded U.S. firms 
that have been acquired by owners from emerging markets over the period 1980-2007.  
The non-parametric approach of PSM allows not only to control for the potential self-selection effects, 
but also to provide reliable estimates of their size. We address the direct effects of privatization through 
FDI, by analyzing the effect of foreign ownership on state owned enterprises that were privatized to a 
foreign investor. We compare their performance to the reference group of companies that were either 
privatized to a domestic investor or not privatized at all. If anywhere - benefits of FDI should be strongest 
in this context. 
3  Data and empirical strategy 
Typically, in this strand of literature dedicated survey based data sets are employed2, which happens both 
for the sake of cross-country comparison and due to the fact that usually other data sets are not available. 
The data set used in this study comes from financial reports and balance sheets of all Polish enterprises 
employing 49 employees or more and covers the period of 1995-2007.  
Data is collected on a quarterly basis by the Central Statistical Office of Poland. The firms covered by 
our sample constitute a significant part of the economy: they employ roughly 29% of the total working 
population of the national economy and 42% of all persons employed on a contract basis. The choice of the 
sampling period is determined by the data availability3. The data is a panel, as each company has a unique 
identifier.  The  total  number  of  observations  exceeds  260  000  over  a  period  of  8  years  (roughly  40 
thousand companies each year). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time these non-survey data 
are used for this type of analysis. 
Since this is not a dedicated dataset, the event of privatization had to be identified from the raw data. 
Using the information on the form of ownership, the year of the change in ownership is treated as the 
moment of privatization. However, this operationalization may raise some doubts from the managerial 
perspective. Namely, although the companies are identifiable in the sample, their identity is not known, 
while the identification is based on a registration number4. However, economic understanding of a firm 
extends beyond the legal entity and entails the employees and the assets. In our data set if the same 
“operations” re-open activity under a new name, the registration number is new as well. Thus, a potential 
limitation  of  our  data  set  emerges,  i.e.  it  is  impossible  to  identify  as  privatization  such  changes  of 
ownership which involved either bankruptcy or liquidation of the legal entity and subsequent re-opening. 
However, this last issue does not seem to be quantitatively important. Namely, neither exit rates (i.e. 
the share of companies that disappear from registry between years) nor entry rates (i.e. the share of 
companies  that  appear  for  the  first  time  in  a  particular  year)  seem  to  be  phenomena  underlying  the 
reliability of our approach, Figure (1). In fact, exit rates are proportionally much higher among the general 
population of medium and large entreprises in general than among SOEs and of much smaller magnitude, 
too. Entry rates are substantially higher than exits from state sector, on the other hand. This implies that 
the potential share of the actually privatised SOEs that cannot be identified in our database because they 
exited and returned to the sample under a different registration number - is very low and cannot drive the 
results. 
                                                        
2 Konings (2001), Schoors and Van Der Tol (2002), Sabirianova Peter, Svejnar and Terrell (2004), Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell 
(2005),  like  the  majority  of  other  studies,  use  Amadeus  data  set,  Gorodnichenko,  Svejnar  and  Terrell  (2007)  use  Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, while Bartelsman, Haskel and Martin (2008) uses ICOP database. 
3 The data has been gathered by the Polish Central Statistical Office as of 1993, but the methodological changes prevent extending 
the analyzed period before 1995. 
4 Any business operation located in Poland needs to have a unique registration number. When the firm is closed, its registration 
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Figure 1: Entry and exit rates for the analysed sample (left panel); exits from SOEs and entry rates 
(right panel 
3.1  Data description 
The database comprises all enterprises from the manufacturing sector (sections C, D and E) and from 
market services (sections G, H, I and K), employing at more than 49 persons, full-time equivalent. The data 
contains balance sheets and profit statement by the companies, as well as the stock of employed at the end 
of the year. All of the companies in the sample are subject to the same accounting regulations, thus making 
the data comparable across firms. However, the accounting regulations have changed over the analyzed 
period,  while  the  companies  also  report  nominal  -  not  real  -  values  on  their  balance  sheets.  Thus, 
comparing  directly  variables  like  profits,  revenues,  assets  or  investment  across  time  would  be 
methodologically doubtful.  
Apart  from  the  financial  information,  the  data  set  allows  to  determine  the  form  of  ownership.  In 
particular, the data set shows whether a firms is state owned, private or has a share of foreign ownership 
(alternatively,  it  may  be  completely  owned  by  a  foreign  entity,  which  is  also  coded  in  the  data  set). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the share of foreign ownership (forms are categorized but 
detailed ownership data are not reported). We define a firm as foreign affiliate if majority of equity is 
owned by non-residents.  
Using the categorical variables describing the form of ownership, we are able to identify cases of firms 
where foreign direct investment is present. We are also able to specify state ownership - either as state-
owned or the so called “sole shareholder company of the State Treasury” - usually a transitory form of 
ownership  post-commercialization  and  pre-privatization  of  many  SOEs.  Furthermore,  observing  the 
enterprises across time we are able to observe changes of the ownership form. For the purpose of this 
analysis we consider firm privatized whenever the ownership type changes from any of the two forms of 
state ownership to any private one. Intersecting these two dimensions - companies with foreign owner at 
each point in time with privatization in a particular year - we are able to diagnose the privatization to a 
foreign investor.  
Finally,  the  data  set  contains  the  information  about  the  total  employment  in  every  firm  (full-time 
equivalent) and industry (two-digit NACE code). 
3.2  Variables definition 
The  original  data  set  contains:  profits,  assets,  own  capital,  investment,  revenues  and  revenues  from 
exports, raw materials costs, and the energy costs. Based on these direct indicators variables, we specify a 
number  of  additional  variables,  (e.g.  return  on  assets  measured  as  profit  over  assets;  or 
internationalization proxied by the share of revenues from exports in total revenues). We are also able to 
derive energy intensity (a share of energy costs in total costs) and scale many variables - e.g. profits and 
investment - by the headcount in each entreprise.  
We have also decided to define additional variable measuring the efficiency of a particular enterprise. 
With the use of the stochastic frontier in a panel version we have estimated time dependent technical 5 
efficiency scores for each company in the sample. Revenues were the output variable, while employment, 
energy, raw materials constituted inputs. Estimations were performed controlling for industry (frontier 
estimated  separately  for  two-digit  NACE  industries)  using  time-varying  decay  model  with  the 
parameterization of time-effects following Battese and Coelli (1995). The assumption of constant returns 
to scale was strongly rejected for each industry and each year. The technical efficiency scores are naturally 
relative, but have been benchmarked to the industry-specific average to avoid confusion. Thus, negative 
values signify industry-relative underperformance and the opposite is true for the positive values. 
The  available  variables  are  used  in  the  subsequent  analysis  in  two  ways:  for  matching  and  for 
evaluating performance.  
•  First, firm specific characteristics that investor may know ex ante are used for matching. These 
include company size i.e. assets, capital and employment. The variables are taken for the face value 
while the nominal effects are no longer relevant because matching is performed for each year 
separately. However, to make sure that matching procedure weights similarly all three aspects of 
company size, we have additionally created categorical variables for each of the three original size 
measures. Basing on their distributions deciles were generated, these categories were subsequently 
transformed into dummies and interacted. Consequently, we are matching on all of these 
characteristics with the same weight. We also control for the capital intensity, energy intensity and 
turnover. We also include an exporter dummy (but not the share of export revenues in sales), 
following the rationale, that actual foreign revenues are a measure of outcome while per se presence 
in the foreign markets is company characteristic. 
•  The second group of the variables are our performance measures - they are known to an 
econometrician ex post, but could not have been known to the investor at the moment of 
privatization. Consequently, they measure the performance of companies - both privatized and 
control group - but they could have not affected the decision of the foreign investor to acquire a 
particular SOE. These variables include: technical efficiency (estimated through the stochastic 
frontier), return on assets, internationalization (share of export revenues in sales), investment 
(scaled by assets and by employment) as well as profits over employment.  
3.3  Data properties 
The initial sample contained over 260 000 observations for over 40 000 enterprises present in the panel 
for - on average - 6.8 years. Unfortunately, this data set is not flawless and contains some erroneous 
observations (e.g. companies with under 49 employees, occasionally negative values of revenues, material 
costs  or  employment),  which  had  to  be  eliminated.  Subsequently,  we  have  inspected  each  of  the  key 
variables to observe if the data set contained outliers. Since profits (expressed both in relation to the assets 
and to overall employment) exhibited few considerable outliers, we have cut 0.5% from both tails of the 
distributions. The resulting data set contains 188 691 observations for 40 152 enterprises over 6.8 years 
on average. All subsequent econometric procedures (including the technical efficiency estimation) were 
conducted on a reduced data set. Data properties are presented in Table 1. 6 
Table 1: Data properties 
Variable  Full Sample Foreign owned firms Privatized firms
Revenues  53 121.68 145 273.6 174 726.6
  (344 804.5) (468 378.6) (1 171 342)
Energy costs  1 231.14 1 898.97 4 598.81
  (9 719.079) (11 210.05) (25 393.46)
Raw materials  16 380.69 45 064.28 22 613.24
  (140 037.1) (252 065.5) (232 392.8)
Employment  197.72 304.10 451.47
  (1 282.76) (796.83) (1 477.35)
Assets/Employment  194.04 330.90 267.07
  (1 102.35) (1 337.53) (1 127.48)
Own capital  22 516.04 44 031.44 82 610.53
  (204 890.7) (235 929.9) (619 074.7)
% of exporting SOE  .0926 .0426 .7232
  (.29) (.20) (.45)
Technical efficiency  .2003 .2075 .0736
  (.29) (.30) (.16)
% of exporters  .4486 .7996 .7232
  (.49) (.40) (.44)
% of formerly SOE  .2034 .0567
  (.40) (.23)
Share of exports in revenues  .1105 .3362 .1651
  (.29) (.37) (.22)
% of foreign owned  .1092 .1753
  (.31) (.38)
% of privatized  .0339 .0545
  (.18) (.23)
Observations  188 691 20 606 6 406
  Note: SOE denotes state-owned enterprises. All monetary values expressed in current Polish zloty. Own calculations based on F-01 data sets. Standard 
deviations in the parentheses.   
Visibly, foreign owned enterprises have on average lower employment, higher revenues, capital, exports 
share  as  well  as  share  of  exporters.  On  the  other  hand,  former  state-owned  enterprises  still  exhibit 
employment overhang and high dependence on energy. Although due to the large size of the sample most 
of these averages could be proven to be in a statistically significant way different one from another - 
standard errors of these averages are considerable, pointing to large heterogeneity of the firms in the 
sample. Detailed characteristics taking into account the industrial composition of the sample are provided 
in the Data Appendix. 
4  Empirical strategy 
Propensity score matching is typically applied to estimate causal treatment effects (e.g. the effectiveness of 
labor market policies, pharmaceutical research or profitability of particular marketing solutions or the 
effect of institutions on economic development). Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) discuss in detail the recent 
development in the area, as well as guide through the process of adequate construct of this approach. The 
critical element in propensity score matching lies in the conditional independence assumption. In other 
words,  for  the  reliability  of  the  results  it  is  important  that  the  selection  is  solely  based  on  observed 
characteristics  and  that  all  variables  that  influence  belonging  to  the  shadow  economy  and  potential 
earnings  are simultaneously  observed. In  practice it implies that  there should  be no  other  sources  of 
systematic (i) selection and (ii) outcome. 
With propensity score matching, the quality of estimation depends much on the data availability. In the 
case of this study, the pool for matching (the size of the control sample in the relation to the size of the 
analyzed sample) is relatively large, so there is no need for sampling with replacement. We apply kernel 
estimates of propensity scores with the kernel density nearest neighbor matching, following Heckman, 
Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998).  
Although the set of variables is limited in this study, we believe relying on the cost structure as well as 
revenues,  size  of  own  capital,  size  of  employment  and  individual  characteristics  (industry  dummy 
interacted  with  the  above  variables)  may  be  sufficient  for  the  stability  of  propensity  score  matching 
approach  and  conformity  with  the  conditional  independence  assumption.  We  verify  this  approach 
empirically by the use of t−tests, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 7 
In particular, we perform a matching procedure based on the following variables: size (measured by 
assets), employment, costs structure (the share of the costs of energy and raw materials), capital intensity 
(measured by own capital over labor) and industry. In principle, for all continuous variables, decimal group 
categorical variables have been generated. Subsequently, all of the above listed variables were interacted 
for the purposes of higher efficiency in the matching procedure. After completing the matching procedure 
we estimate two first moments for the control group the treated group and the matched untreated group 
with respect to the following variables: (i) profits over assets, profits over employment, investment over 
assets,  share  of  exports  in  revenues  as  well  as  technical  efficiency  parameter.  These  moments  are 
estimated separately for each year. Finally, we decompose the initial differentials into self-selection and 
treatment components by comparing the moments for the matched untreated and treated to the size of the 
gap between the unmatched untreated and treated. 
For  the  graphical  representation  of  the  results  we  chose  the  following  way.  First,  for  each  of  the 
analysis,  we  have  separated  the  treated  group,  the  control  group  and  the  reference  group:  these  are 
privatized companies, matched “state ever companies” and all “state ever” companies, respectively. By 
computing the moments for each of the groups and each of the “output” measures we were able to define 
(i) the levels for unmatched untreated as opposed to the levels of treated at each point in time and (ii) 
decompose the differential to disentangle the effect of self-selection and the effect of treatment. This was 
obtained through computing the following decomposition: 
OutcomeTreated – OutcomeUnmatched = (OutcomeTreated – OutcomeMatched) 
  + (OutcomeMatched – OutcomeUnmatched) 
We call the former term in the brackets the “privatization effect” and the later “self-selection effect”. Since 
the size of differentials differ across variables and across time, at each point in time we have scaled it by 
the combined effect of “self-selection” and “privatization” (i.e. OT-OUM). Naturally, these differentials do not 
need to be positive - negative contributions signify that either of the effects was detrimental to the 
performance. Contributions are expressed as a share in pre-matching differential (i.e. (OM-OUM)/(OT-OUM)  
and (OT-OM)/(OT-OUM) for the purposes of comparisons across time and variables5).   
5  Results 
We  define  several  structural  indicators  that  help  us  characterize  the  performance,  foreign  market 
orientation  and  capital  intensity  of  firms  under  consideration.  We  define  the  Profits/Assets, 
Profits/Employment,  Investment/Assets,  Export  share  and  Technical  Efficiency  variables.  Unfortunately, 
export  revenues  cover  only  direct  exports,  and  not  exports  through  other  local  firms,  which  may 
underestimate export value. The variables under consideration are summarized in the Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Performance indicators 
Variable  Full Sample Foreign-owned firms  Privatized firms
Technical Efficiency  .1358 .1526  .0464
  (.2597) (.2694)  (.1122)
Profits/Assets  .0513 .0589  .007
  (.1734) (.1435)  (.1244)
Profits/Employment  10.1211 24.958  11.1696
  (145.1214) (186.2487)  (105.3916)
Investment/Assets  .0795 .0909  .0673
  (.2521) (.1137)  (.08)
Export/Revenues  .1211 .3432  .1669
  (.3481) (.3662)  (.2291)
Observations  125958 15546  5356
  Note: Own calculations based on F-01 data sets. Standard deviations in the parentheses.   
 
                                                        
5 UM denotes untreated companies (still SOEs or privatized to a domestic investor; the reference group), T denotes privatized 
companies (the treated group), M denotes the matched untreated companies (the control group). Treated are all companies that 
changed a form of ownership from state to private foreign in a particular year. Controls are all companies that were state owned at 
any point in time, including the particular year. 8 
We focus on the direct effects of privatization through FDI. Treatment follows from the presence of a 
foreign  owner  and  the  reference group  consists  of  companies  that  were “ever”  state  owned,  but in  a 
particular  year  have  no  foreign  ownership.  Consequently,  the  control  group  comprises  both  firms 
previously privatized to a domestic investor and those who have not been privatized yet.  
Propensity score matching procedure requires testing the balancing of the matching procedure. Due to 
the fact that we actually run 13 independent matching procedures (one for each year) as well as the 
multiplicity of variables, it is not possible to report the direct balancing properties6. However, one may 
compute the percentage of the bias reduction thanks to matching. In Table 3 we report the bias reduction 
and the number of treated units with respect to each analyze for each year in the sample. 
Table 3: Bias reduction due to matching and sample sizes 
Mean bias (%)  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Before matching  17.7 17.6 21.6 24.2 28.8 25.0 22.8 23.2 21.7 24.5 24.9 23.9
After matching  5.6 4.1 3.2 3.7 2.3 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.6 1.9
Sample size  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Treated  16 51 82 87 96 125 156 164 172 169 173 173
Control group  967 2585 2558 2402 1983 2305 2419 2064 1813 1445 1594 1474
Note: Own calculations based on F-01 data sets.  Mean, unweighed averaging applied to compute the mean bias in the selection bias.  
Figures 2-4 present the estimates of the direct effect of privatization to the foreign investors on firm 
performance. As suggested earlier, we inspect the changes in performance by analyzing return on assets, 
profits per employee (π/L ratio), investment intensity, export share and technical efficiency. In each case 
we compare the performance of the firms privatized to the foreign investor (solid line) and non-privatized 
state  owned  enterprises  (dashed  line).  In  addition,  we  present  the  relative  contributions  of  the  self-
selection effect (light bar) and the privatization effect (dark bar). If the difference between the privatized 
and the state owned enterprises is statistically significant neither before nor after the matching procedure, 
no bar is displayed. 
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Figure 2: Profits over assets (left) and per employee (right) 
Inspecting the performance in terms of ROA, one may observe that the superior results of enterprises 
privatized to the foreign investors are visible only in the period of 2005-2007. The difference between the 
treaded  and  the  comparison  group  is  not  significant  before  2005.  However,  in  the  recent  years  the 
difference is significant both pre- and post-matching, while majority of the differential is attributable to the 
self-selection effect only. These results suggest that in fact only post-EU accession the profitability of SOEs 
privatized to the foreign investors is in fact superior7.  
                                                        
6 Detailed logs are available from authors upon request. 
7 It is possible that the insignificance of the ROA differential emerged from large increases of the assets by foreign owners. While 
this assertion may not be empirically tested (the size of the assets is a matching variable and thus cannot be used as a performance 
measure). Nonetheless, the analysis of the sales efficiency seems to shed some more light. 9 
π/L ratio behaves fairly similarly to ROA. It has been fairly comparable over most of analyzed period 
time. Both pre- and post-matching differences were not statistically significant in most of the analyzed 
period. 1997 and 2000 were associated with relatively larger privatisation activity (1997 was the largest 
post-1994).  When significant, the contribution from privatization is very low and sometimes even negative 
while most of the differential is attributable to self-selection. This may be explained by the fact that many 
of the privatized companies implemented employment reduction plans already prior to privatization event. 
The results seem to suggest also a lack of convergence in terms of profits over assets between firms 
privatized to foreign investors and other privatized or SOEs. This is opposite to the findings of Greenaway, 
Sousa and Wakelin (2004) in the case of UK. However, while most of the differential for both ROA and π/L 
is  attributable  to  the  selection  effect,  recently  privatization  contributions  seem  to  be  augmenting  the 
differential between the two groups of the enterprises. Comparing the contributions of privatization for the 
π/L ratio and for ROA with less pronounced contribution in the former case suggests that changes in assets 
(e.g. capital and intangible intellectual property brought by foreign investors into companies) are unable to 
explain the emerging gap. The lack of convergence suggests also that indeed there may be little support for 
the hypothesis of positive spillovers, as previously argued by Zukowska-Gagelmann (2000). However, the 
reference group consists of present and former SOEs only which makes our analysis unsuited to evaluate 
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Figure 3: Investment over employee (left) and share of export in sale revenues (right) 
Unlike  profits,  investment  intensity  measured  by  the  ratio  of  investment  to  assets  seems  to  exhibit 
convergence. Decomposition analysis suggests that foreing ownership fosters propensity to invest, with the 
impact of treatment ranging between 40% and 90% over the 1997-2000 period (years of relatively weak 
performance of the economy). As of 2002 foreing ownership contribution decreases to eventually become 
insignificant  in  2006.  This  suggests  that  -  former  or  present  -  state  owned  enterprises  are  actually 
relatively successful in obtaining finance and mobilizing resources for investment. 
Export share exhibits strong divergence between firms privatized to foreign investor and the control 
group. In fact, the contribution of foreign ownership is both consistent and largest in the context of this 
particular performance indicator but its relative importance decreases over time. The early years seem to 
be  associated  with  no  difference  in  internationalization,  while  as  of  1998  a  strong  contribution  of 
privatization becomes apparent. Naturally, foreign investors tend to choose companies already engaged 
outside the domestic markets but the share of export revenues in total sales is growing radically as of 1997 
and this effect gains importance towards the end of the analyzed period. 
The increasing disparity between SOEs and the control group is mainly a consequence of increasing 
export intensity by the privatized companies (the share among SOEs and firms privatized to the domestic 
investor is relatively constant over time). The difference is as large as threefold towards the end of the 
analyzed period. Foreign ownership believed to be a crucial mean for accessing the global trading networks 
creates 50%-60% of the observed differential towards the end of the sample. The rest of the discrepancy 
should  be  attributed  to  the  internal  potential  of  the  analyzed  firms,  thus  strong  self-selection  bias. 
Importantly, we  do  not  analyze  the  propensity  to  export,  but  actual  export  shares in  revenues, which 
reflects more the actual effects of the presence in the global trading networks than access to them. In other 10 
words, our findings suggest that FDI chooses firms that are already export-oriented but also causes the 
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Figure 4: Technical efficiency 
As far as technical efficiency is concerned, the superiority of FDI-privatized firms is clear. In fact, SOEs and 
firms privatized domestically tend to be characterized by efficiency scores below the industry specific 
mean. However, this effect is largely attributable to the self selection. Only in six out of analysed years 
majority of the differential follows the foreign ownership. Moreover, an interesting observation concerning 
the lack “catching up” emerges from this analysis. The superiority of the foreign affiliates was only slighly 
more pronounced early in the sample and essentially does not seem to have decreased. This suggests that 
the process is highly heterogeneous across industries and companies and foreign ownership does not bring 
indispensably  crucial  premium  in  efficiency  -  on  the  contrary,  investors  frequently  single  out  better 
companies to acquire. This implies that statistical twins drew from the population of domestically owned 
privatized enterprises and SOEs actually keep up with the rate of the efficiency evolution. This finding is 
not  only  exceptionally  robust  (large  t−statistics)  but  also  surprising.  Many  of  the  SOEs  implemented 
recovery programs, while many of the privatization agreements involved pro-efficiency commitments from 
the foreign owner (e.g. undertaking certain investment projects, maintaining employment, etc.). Despite 
these efforts, some statistical twins perform comparably well, suggesting this is not the “hand” of the 
foreign owner but the effort to modernize and restructure that stands behind relatively good performance 
of the privatized firms. 
To give more context to our findings one should also take into account the nature of FDI flowing into 
CEECs. Namely, the reallocation towards Eastern and Central Europe was motivated by the lower labor 
costs, presence of special economic zones and the geographic proximity to the EU markets. Moreover, 
accession to the EU implies virtually tariff-less trade with other Member States. These characteristics are 
typical of all CEECs, while our analysis covering the Polish enterprises provides insights into the role the 
process of privatization to the foreign investor might have played in this context.  
Summing up, for the majority of the performance indicators, there is relatively little evidence on the 
positive direct effects of the privatization via FDI. While the literature typically found that in the context of 
transition the effect of foreign ownership is unequivocally positive, Konings (2001), our results are fairly 
consistent  with  the  findings  concerning  developed  countries, e.g.  Girma  (2005),  Girma,  Görg  and  Pisu 
(2008).  We  find  a  positive  contribution  to  the  internationalization  as  well  as  transitory  effect  on 
investment intensity and efficiency. However, the self-selection effects are not only statistically significant, 
but  in  the  case  of  some  variables -  e.g.  ROA,  π/L  ratio  -  are actually capturing  most  of  the observed 
performance differential. 
6  Conclusions 
In evaluating the effect of FDI on the performance in the hosting country, controlling the self-selection of 
FDI into sectors of economy and firms within sector is a necessary precondition to achieve reliable results. 
It  is  natural  to  expect  that  FDI  may  actually  be  only  interested  in  acquiring  already  well-performing 11 
companies. The process of privatization for most of the transition countries typically consisted of choosing 
among  relatively  few  buyers.  With  the  exception  of  spectacular  privatizations  via  the  stock  exchange, 
typical path involved a recovery plan implemented prior to privatization and finding an interested buyer. 
The performance of foreign owned firms, especially in transition economies, was usually believed to be 
higher than that of the local ones due to the technological spillovers and know-how transfer. In practice, 
this is equivalent to an implicit assumption about a considerable value added via the means of foreign 
ownership.  Therefore,  one  needs  to  resort  to  firm-level  data  and  preferably  control  for  the  potential 
selection bias. 
In this paper we revisited the effect of privatization to a foreign owner on firm-level performance in a 
hosting  economy  using  data  from  1995-2007  period  for  all  Polish  medium  and  large  enterprises.  We 
applied propensity score matching to provide basis for decomposing the performance differentials into the 
part  attributable  to  the  self-selection  of  privatized  companies  and  a  part  attributable  to  the  foreign 
ownership  itself.  Previous  studies  found  superior  performance  despite  self-selection  using  Heckman 
(1979)  approach.  We  contribute  to  the  literature  in  two  ways:  using  new  data  and  decomposing  the 
differential while controlling for considerable heterogeneity across firms. 
The conclusions of this study shed new light on the role that FDI played in privatization. Namely, we 
find  FDI-driven  improvements in  terms  of  the  access  to  the  global  markets.  In  addition, we  also  find 
evidence supporting the claim of increased investment intensity by the foreign owner. However, higher 
production efficiency as well as profitability of the privatized enterprises is partially due to the selection 
effect as well. Thus, the findings are largely consistent with the existing literature. Similarly to developed 
economies, in transition countries, privatization through FDI increases access to foreign trading networks. 
The lack of evidence in support of the higher profitability of foreign owned companies may be explained by 
corporate policies geared towards shifting profits to the mother company. However, contrary to what has 
been claimed in most of the transition literature, we find no positive privatization effects on efficiency, as 
most of the observed productivity differential is attributable to self-selection. 
Our results give an important insight into the effect of privatization through foreign direct investment 
using an example of an economy undergoing transition from centrally planned to market governance. 
Exploring the  data for  Polish  medium  and large entreprises we show  that previous estimates  tend to 
underplay the economic importance of the self-selection effects. In practice, these effects may result from 
both  demand and supply factors.  The  decision to  undertake  the privatization  procedure was typically 
driven by the fiscal needs and the expected likelihood of success in finding an interested buyer. These odds 
are naturally influenced by firms performance, thus self-selection is an inherent part of this process. To 
assure that  privatization through  FDI  actually contributes  to improving  the  performance of  the whole 
economy,  however,  government  should  implement  instruments  assuring  that  the  efficiency  gains  will 
actually  occur.  While  further  analyses  are  required  to  test  the  robustness  of  these  results  and  their 
applicability to other countries, these results seem to suggest that in the case of Poland privatization to a 
foreign investor did not bring on average expected efficiency gains. 12 
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Data appendix 
Table 4: Formerly state-owned firms privatized through FDI (percentage of the number of foreign 
owned firms 
Sector/year  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Construction  1,23  2,17  4,00  3,51  10,71  8,16  9,62  6,25  5,08  3,28 
Education  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
Health and social work  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  16,67  16,67  11,11  7,14  7,14 
Hotels and restaurants  2,38  2,17  4,76  8,70  13,64  15,00  15,79  12,50  10,71  8,00 
Manufacturing  3,33  6,01  5,70  6,13  7,28  7,94  7,69  8,21  7,53  7,56 
Mining  10,00  18,18  25,00  21,43  35,71  41,67  38,46  35,71  23,08  21,43 
Real estate and business  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,78  0,82  1,33  1,36  0,57  0,48 
Trade and repairs  0,00  0,00  0,41  0,32  0,98  0,97  0,91  0,56  0,53  0,50 
Transport and storage  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  2,99  2,94  2,53  3,03  3,09  3,16 
Elecricity, gas etc,  0,00  33,33  25,00  25,00  41,67  70,59  70,83  77,78  79,31  82,76 
Note: Own calculations based on F-01 data sets.    
  
Table 5: Formerly state-owned firms privatized through FDI (percentage of revenues of all foreign 
owned firms 
Sector/year  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Construction  4,52  6,55  3,49  1,31  16,96  3,93  2,56  2,98  4,24  4,10 
Education  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
Health and social work  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  16,80  12,88  9,37  5,23  4,43 
Hotels and restaurants  7,54  5,73  5,15  4,78  16,36  15,65  13,80  12,72  12,67  4,92 
Manufacturing  12,06  18,66  15,76  14,66  17,26  16,70  16,05  21,18  19,15  18,20 
Mining  22,58  37,78  49,44  29,31  69,48  75,30  74,95  67,74  48,25  45,85 
Real estate and business  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  1,81  2,51  2,98  2,03  1,28  1,12 
Trade and repairs  0,00  0,00  0,06  0,04  0,16  0,38  0,31  0,11  0,13  0,18 
Transport and storage  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,42  8,12  6,76  5,49  59,06  54,51 
Electricity, gas etc,  0,00  77,92  73,79  66,92  89,49  93,43  91,51  92,01  95,57  93,95 
Note: Own calculations based on F-01 data sets.    